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Political philosophy is a phenomenology, not a science. A phenomenon of
the physical world, a phenomenon-for-science, is an event that is to be ex-
plained. The event is conceived as being something other than its explanation.'
But when the task is the task of explaining political behavior, phenomena-for-
philosophy of the social world, it is three times more problematic. In the first
place, the thing to be explained is something that already contains ideas as an
integral part of its functioning. Our explanation is a set of ideas about, among
other things, a set of ideas. And, secondly, the political phenomenon we are
studying is also being studied by those who participate in it as they act politi-
cally. Political actors know that they are acting politically. Part of their action
is to promote their own idea of their own action. This leads to a golden rule
for political philosophers: one explanation of political action which we will
always reject is the explanation that the political actors themselves accept, since
their ideas are part of what is to be explained. Thirdly, to philosophize is to
act socially. To philosophize about political action is itself political action. We
cannot avoid playing a part in the process we are studying.
So it is that when we seek to explain philosophically a set of political
phenomena, such as the constitutional development of the European Communi-
ty, we find ourselves caught in a hermeneutic web, explaining phenomena by
explaining explanations of phenomena, making phenomena in explaining them.
The historian faces analogous higher-level problems, but with a significant
variation. The object of study of the historian seems to be some sort of indepen-
dent reality, historical reality. Past events, phenomena-for-history, seem to have
some sort of real existence, reminiscent of the seemingly real existence of
physical phenomena-for-science. They are out there in time, having formerly
been out there in time and space. Unlike contemporary political phenomena,
they are beyond change, over and done with. They are inert presences waiting
passively for us to explain them. So the historian is able to work on the basis
t Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.
1. This is not to ignore the intense debate of recent decades as philosophers of science have struggled
with the problem of the relationship between ideas of science and the events that they seek to explain. See
P. FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD (1975); T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962);
K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959).
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of a hypothesis that there is something to be explained that is not only philo-
sophically and chronologically prior to the explanation, but that is also capable
of surviving intact our explanation of it, waiting to be explained again by
another historian.
But the historian's past-in-the-present thing-in-itself is no less a mind-made
thing-for-us than any contemporary social phenomenon. And, in one respect,
it is even more uncertain. Every historical presence is also many absences. We
know only a small amount about the infinite complexity of past events. And
we only know that small amount through the refractive medium in which it
happens to have survived (physical remains, contemporary documents, memoirs,
the work of previous historians). History shares with natural science the idea
of causation and it behaves as if historical reality, however fortuitously assem-
bled from the relics of the past, were capable of being disassembled into
significant constellations of events with assignable locations in time and space,
so that they can then be re-ordered into patterns of cause and effect. However,
from our knowledge of contemporary social phenomena, we have good reason
to believe that the past is an unbroken and inextricable continuum in time and
space, that there are no presences in the past, only processes.
So it is that the political phenomena of society, viewed philosophically and
viewed historically, can never be regarded as having been explained, even
provisionally, in the way that successful hypotheses of science have a temporary
finality if they are judged to be consistent with all that is currently and relevant-
ly observable in the physical world. No one explanation of a political phenome-
non can be regarded as uniquely privileged, irresistibly convincing, or defini-
tive. Everything is permitted. Everything may be superseded. So, if Joseph
Weiler proposes that we explain the development of the European Community
endogenously, then we may explain his explanation in our own way, and
thereby propose other explanations which, in their turn, are liable to be judged
and dialectically superseded.'
The term "endogenous explanation" is here intended to refer to an explana-
tion that is extracted from within the phenomenon itself. Such an explanation
seeks to rationalize the internal development of the phenomenon, to find a
coherence over time, a line of development over time, an inherent pattern
capable of extrapolation into the future. It seeks to find such things by selecting
and arranging phenomenal events and states of affairs into patterns dictated by
an inner logic of the totalized phenomenon. The totalizing of the phenomenon
(the European Community) is an act of detachment of that phenomenon from
things external to it, and indeed, from excluded internalities. That is to say, in
the case of the European Community, it abstracts the phenomenon not only
2. Weiler himself disclaims any intention of offering, on this occassion, anything more than what he
calls a "pure theory" explanation, or what one might prefer to call a "positivist" explanation, in the
Austinian rather than the Comtean sense of that word. See Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE
L.J. 2403, 2409-10 (1991).
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from the rest of European history and world history, but also from what are
conceived as non-Community phenomena occurring within the land-space and
time-space of the Community.
Such an explanatory procedure is at its most convincing in the reporting of
games. It is possible to report on a game (say, a game of American football)
with little or no reference to externalities. A game is a world of its own, totally
self-coherent in its own rules and its own language and its own ideology. It has
a clear locus in time and space. Externalities may be brought into the descrip-
tion (payments, bribes, drugs, transfers, weather). And externalities are essential
to make the game possible (the laws of physics, the social system that makes
the game physically and socially possible). But the story of a particular game
seems to be a complete story even if it is told without any reference to things
external to it.
The story of the European Community can be presented in a similar way.
In the first quarter, the Commission made the best of its opportunities. In the
second quarter, the Court of Justice carried the ball. In the third quarter, the
Council has dominated the game. In the fourth quarter, who knows? Probably
the Central Bankers will run rings 'round everyone else. And it is possible to
posit rules of the game from the Community's constitutional texts. Then it is
possible to say that there has been some bending of the rules, some cases of
"not playing the game," cheating even (the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966
concerning qualified majority voting in the Council, the more frequent use of
Article 235,1 the Court's playing fast-and-loose with the text of the Treaties,
the strange abstracting of Community matters from the control of the European
Convention on Human Rights).
It is possible to incorporate semi-externalities, such as the pre-game tactical
tale of the team coach (the intentions of the "founding fathers" of the Commu-
nity). It is possible to regard the four institutions of the Community not merely
as fortuitous collections of disparate human beings, getting through their
business from day to day, but as will-endowed entities, each with a team-history
and a team-spirit and strategies.
It is even possible to say, as Professor Weiler does, that the rules of the
game seem somehow to have changed during the course of the game. The
referees (the Court of Justice, national parliaments) acquiesced, or looked the
other way, as the Community extended the field of play stealthily and not so
stealthily (creeping Community competence, Community fundamental rights
conjured out of thin air by the Court of Justice, the "bricolage" parliamentari-
zing of the European Parliament). Maybe they have failed even to notice that
the whole nature of the game changed during the course of play, as if what
started out as a game of American football ended up as a game of soccer (the
gradual displacement of supranationalism by intergovernmentalism).
3. EEC Treaty, art. 235. See Weiler, supra note 2, at 2443-44.
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History as sports reporting is history in the safe mainstream of historiogra-
phy, the history that sound and sensible historians practice, fortified by Ranke's
notorious injunction to historians "merely to tell it like it was" ("bloss zeigen,
wie es eigentlich gewesen").4 But it is history which is liable to violate the
spirit, if not the letter, of the golden rule proposed above, in that it attaches
major explanatory significance to what political actors think and say they are
doing. It is history that is favored by those who, innocently or advisedly, by
deed if not by word, propagate the idea that the writing of history is a philo-
sophically unproblematic activity. It is status quo history, not counterrevolution-
ary but antirevolutionary. It is history which assumes that the future will be a
continuation, at most an evolutionary variation, of the present.
Without disputing any particular aspect of the remarkable dynamic analysis
that Joseph Weiler has offered of the intensely complex political and legal
phenomenon which is the European Community, we are led to ask whether the
actual and urgent problems besetting the organic development of the Communi-
ty, such as the very problems which his analysis has brought to light, do not
now call for a revolutionary change in the Community's consciousness of its
self, a change which requires a new approach to the questions of its philosophi-
cal and historical significance.
To alter Europe's consciousness of its self will require a philosophical
reconsideration of what it is; and that will require an historical reconsideration
of what it was. Those concerned to remake European self-consciousness will
be obliged to choose their historical weapon from the well-stocked armory of
historical method, to choose the kind of history-making which a society needs
when it is remaking itself in consciousness.
There are historians who have invited us to believe that it is possible to
assign causes to past events, and, having found causes, they feel able, like
natural scientists, to form hypotheses, and even laws, which could enable us
to predict, and even to control, the future. The much-maligned heroes of
historicist-determinism have been Hegel and Marx and Toynbee and Spengler.
For historians of this kind, European integration could be made to fit into
patterns which extend effortlessly to include the whole past and the whole
future of the human race.
There are subdeterminist historians who see macro-patterns in the past,
significant functions formed from the mass of contingent variables, patterns of
geography and race and culture and nation. Such patterns may be seen by such
historians as liable to form the shape of the future, even if only as a default
effect (that is to say, with the future liable to follow the same pattern unless
steps are taken to bring about other effects). And the mere identification of such
patterns is liable to affect our understanding of the present, and may thereby
4. L. VON RANKE, HISTORY OF THE LATIN AND TEUTONIC NATIONS (1494 TO 1415), in 23/24 WERKE,
at vii (G. Dennis trans. rev. ed. 1909) (1874) (translation of the quoted passage is my own).
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influence the form of the future by influencing the form of our future-making
behavior. Montesquieu and Comte and Savigny are representative figures of
this kind of history. For such historians, European integration might be ex-
plained as the epiphenomenal product of some set of distinctively European
primary phenomena.5
It is also possible to write history which demonstrates a sub-determinist
belief in history as a drama in which human nature (reason and will, virtues
and vices) plays a leading role, locked in a struggle with inevitabile suprahuman
events and circumstances. Hume and Voltaire and Gibbon and Tolstoy may
stand as representatives of this all-too-human form of history. To understand
human nature helps to understand human history. To understand human history
helps to understand human nature. To know European history, it might be
useful to know the European spirit.
But another kind of historymaking is also possible, a kind which is particu-
larly well adapted to the task of reforming social reality through the reforming
of social consciousness. Its main philosophical pre-assumption is that history
is an ever-present reality-in-consciousness. The future is already present in the
past. The past will be present in the future. But the relevant past is the total
past, that is to say, not only the supposedly detached historical reality of events
but also the subjective reality of human consciousness, as it forms, and is
formed by, social existence through time. And social consciousness includes
evaluative consciousness, conceiving of the past and the future as realms of
choice. On this view, history-making is not disabled but enriched by being
trapped in the hermeneutic web. Political philosophy and historical conscious-
ness participate creatively in the explaining and in the explained.
Such history is history as genealogy-to use Nietzsche's metaphor. It is
history as archaeology-to use a favorite metaphor of Freud. It is history in the
spirit of Herder, and exemplified in recent times by the late Michel Foucault.
It is, approximately, Marxist history minus determinism.
The relevant feature of genealogy and archaeology is that they work back-
ward. The family tree is constructed by the genealogist working backward from
the present generation. The archaeologist digs down through the past, layer by
layer. So, too, history, instead of taking the date of some turning-point in time
and recounting a story from that date foward, may seek to find its way into the
social and psychological depths. Every situation and institution which is familiar
to us today contains the whole of its past and the whole of its future genetical-
ly, as it were. History of this kind is, one may say, history as psychobiology.
The idea of the ever-present past and the already-present future is an
empowering, liberating, invigorating idea. History is not fate. History is not
dead. It is a set of possibilities. Such an idea is also an onerous idea. We are
5. For a recent example of a work which has been treated by at least some of its readers as sub-
determinist in character, see P. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS (1987) (especially
ch. 8).
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responsible for the past, and so we are responsible for the future. We and no
one else or no thing else must choose among the possibilities left by the past.
It is we who will make the future, as it was we who made the past. And the
future we make will become the present and then the past of our successors.
Europe will be made by the Europe that Europe has made. Europe will be made
by its own idea of what Europe could be.
The biological history of present-day Europe is a triple helix of interacting
strands: the strand of international relations, the strand of internal national
development, and the strand of European culture, of the European spirit. The
European Community is a striking example of an effect produced by causes
in all three strands of the European social process.
For twenty-six centuries, in Europe, we have developed a theory of society.
(The United States is here included as expatriate Europe, a scion of European
culture.) That theory of society has been made not in a linear way, from ancient
Greece onward, but in an accretive way, forming and reforming itself in a
dialectical relation with social reality. The social theorizing of Europe is
Europe's ever-evolving social self-contemplation. It is not a process in time,
so much as a process in depth.
The idea of democracy haunted self-reflecting social theory since the very
beginning. It is an obscure and unstable complex of ideas, a social enzyme,
endlessly producing dramatic social effects within national societies: action and
reaction, dissent and revolution, social progress and social conflict. However,
a notable phenomenon has been the marginal role of the idea of democracy
within the social process of international relations. There the idea of democracy
has been a presence in its relative absence, generating occasional events of
international relations, but never acting as a dominant general cause. European
international relations proceeded on a separate track, separate from the demo-
cratic struggle within the national societies, apart from the dramatic achieve-
ments of internal social progress. The states of Europe conducted their so-called
international relations within an idea-structure called not democracy but diplo-
macy.
Diplomacy was conducted by the executive branches of the national govern-
ments, in processes that were only weakly integrated into the internal democrat-
ic process. Against the background of ceaseless internal social change, states
continued to behave in relation to each other externally in the old familiar way,
as quasi-persons, more or less as feudal barons, treating their national territory
as a power-conferring landholding, the source of what was called their "sover-
eign power" or "sovereignty." The external theory of society was scarcely more
than the pursuit of so-called national interest by the exercise of power, power
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that might be exercised in any form dictated by utilitarian and instrumental
considerations.
The result was the existence of an internal life of society which, put in ideal
theoretical terms, could be labeled a rationalist-progressive pursuit of ever-
increasing well-being for all the people in accordance with a given society's
highest values. And there also was an external life of society, seeking the well-
being of the state by any means and at anyone's expense. And the reality of
the relation of the European states over recent centuries reflected the theoretical
structure: intrinsically unstable and conflicting, occasionally life-threatening on
a very grand scale.
The essence of the phenomenon of the European Community is that the
development of the interrelationship of the nations of Western Europe has been
put into the same framework as the framework of their national social develop-
ment. Or, to put it another way, the well-being of all the peoples of Western
Europe became part of the common concern of each of the peoples of Western
Europe. Or, to put it still another way, the interrelationship of the nations of
Western Europe was democratized. Such is the genetic nature of the European
Community. Such is the possibility of its future. Democracy replaces diploma-
cy. European values at their highest complete the highest national values.
The question is, in what sense of the word "democracy" is the European
Community a democratizing process?
It may seem surprising to say that the United States is not a fully-developed
democracy. But it is instructive to consider the sense in which it is not. The
United States is performing an historical function, at the level of world culture,
in acting as the symbol of democracy, rather like ancient Athens. But the truth
is that the United States, like ancient Athens, is an aberrant democracy. It is
essentially a democracy of vintage circa-1835, organizing a twentieth-century
economy.
One clue to the nature of U.S. democracy may be found in the dominance
of elections in the American political process. Elections are, however, merely
the means by which a power-holding oligarchy is licensed. The essential
problem of democracy is not who is to form the power-holding oligarchy, but
what is the social system that can control the purposes and the performance of
the power-holding oligarchy? In other words, the most important democratic
question is not who is government by?, but what is government for? Not how
is state power organized?, but what is (in Montesquieu's words) the spirit of
the laws? Not (in Lenin's words) who whom? nor (in Lasswell's words) who
gets what, when, how, but who why?
A second clue lies in a comparison with the democracies of Western
Europe. The democracies of Western Europe are post-Marxist societies. This
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is a proposition that may seem surprising or shocking to many Americans (and
to some Europeans).
The ideas of Marx, and of other early- and mid-nineteenth century radicals
and revolutionaries, very profoundly affected the development of Western
European societies. They had a direct effect in the making of theoretical
socialism, the formation of political parties of the Left, and the development
of trade unionism. But one of the remaining trace elements they left in Europe-
an society is an idea of the profoundest significance, which is at the heart of
what is in this analysis called the modern form of democracy: the idea that all
public power is held only in the interest of the people, that all public power
exists only for promoting the well-being of all the people. Public power is not
merely the social hallowing of individual power. Liberal democracy is not
merely a matter of the Lockean "assent of the governed" or Rousseauean
"willforming," but rather a revolutionary subordination of the government to
the highest values of society generated in a society's total social process.6
The United States remains a political system for aggregating individual
interest in the eighteenth-century fashion, rather than a political system for
realizing the communal interest. It is individualism aggregated, rather than
communalism distributed. And, of course, most Americans are proud of that
fact. The consequence is that the American system has no need for political
parties, since there is no communal vision to struggle for, and no need of
political philosophy, or even philosophy tout court, since there is no communal
vision to reimagine.7 Western Europe, on the other hand, had two hundred
years of intense political and philosophical struggle, sometimes wasteful and
destructive. An outcome of that struggle is that democracy seems, at least for
the time being, to be a system for communalizing all socially significant
decisionmaking in accordance with a society's highest values. And that state
of affairs has come to seem natural and normal to most people in Western
Europe.
Both forms of democracy have a shadow side. The disadvantages of the
U.S. form include the acceptance of a pool of partly-socialized citizens-in-
waiting, the problem of how to socialize very diverse citizens, the high level
of antisocial violence, excessive dependence on litigation as a leading social
process, and the uncertain philosophical basis of safety-net welfare and of social
services in general. The disadvantages of the West European form of democracy
include the stifling of individual energy and initiative, a mentality of public
6. On the role of the "total social process" in the self-creating of a society, see P. ALLOIr, EUNOMIA-
NEWv ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD (1990) (especially chs. 2, 3).
7. Critical Legal Studies is a poignant longing for social philosophy. Hence its "unAmerican" frisson.
To a European observer, the two main American political parties seem to exist only in order to make
elections possible. It is touching that, in the 20th century, each of the more self-confident U.S. Presidents
has proposed, with more and less practical effect, a mild dose of ad hoe communalism, encapsulated in a
slogan: the Square Deal (T. Roosevelt); the New Freedom (International Communalism) (Wilson); The New
Deal (F.D. Roosevelt); the New Frontier (Kennedy); the Great Society (Johnson).
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welfare dependency, and too submissive an attitude to governmental authority
of all kinds.
It looks as if the Soviet Union may, with a great deal of difficulty and
subject to many further miracles, be on the way to becoming another post-
Marxist society, with government for the people replacing government of the
people. We are still waiting for the American Revolution.
The modem Western European form of democracy lies at the heart of the
European Community. Historically, the function of the Community was to raise
the communal interest to the level of the aggregate of the peoples of Western
Europe. The idea was that the communal factor in public decisionmaking would
come to be not merely the aggregation of the self-interests of the particular
nations but the finding of a common interest through a European social process.
It was in this sense that the Community was to be a democratizing of the
international relations of Western Europe. International relations would be
transcended, surpassed, and replaced with a new kind of democratic process.
The essence of the European Community is not a federalizing of the Member
States, still less a confederalizing. The essence is the democratizing, that is to
say the communalizing, of the inter se relations of the peoples of Europe. It
is the incorporation of the European public interest in a new kind of social
system. The arbitration of last resort would no longer be force but the European
common interest.
The ingenious method chosen by the creators of the Community was to
generate a social system as a by-product of an economic system. The main
constitutional treaty (the EEC Treaty) creates what is called a Common Market
on the basis of a GATT customs union. The Common Market is a customs
union with all the harmonization of law and pooling of government necessary
to remove distortions of economic activity attributable to national frontiers.
The idea was that, in a modern society, economic activity is at the heart
of all government. To harmonize law and to pool government for economic
purposes requires consideration of a communal European interest going far
beyond economic and legal technicalities. And the accumulator effect-of
power coordinated among a group of highly energetic and highly advanced
societies-far exceeds the mere business opportunities of a single marketplace.
But the particular ingenuity of the idea was that each step of the communal-
izing process, however ineluctable it might be from a historical-biological point
of view, would be taken as part of the day-to-day activity of the new European
social system. It would not be the result of obedience to some supposed decree
of the founding fathers, not the working-out of some preordained and soon
outdated program.
1991] 2493
The Yale Law Journal
So it was that the European Community was a novelty, a completely new
kind of social order. It was that rare event, a new idea. And, rarest event of all,
it was a new idea that had the possibility of very soon becoming permanent
social reality. In other words, the young European Community had something
of the historical and philosophical significance of the young United States of
America or the France of 1789 or the young Soviet Union under Lenin.
These precedents were not propitious. The United States became an uninno-
cent and unfocused and un-unique Great Power. The French Revolution der
scended into terror and was commandeered by Bonaparte, its self-proclaimed
child, a relatively benign dictator who, nevertheless, left hundreds of thousands
dead all over Europe in an anachronistic campaign of public violence. Lenin's
ambiguous revolution was taken over by Stalin, a tsar of the modernizing kind,
but a cruel and calculating tsar nonetheless.
In accordance with a post-Newtonian law of social development, every
dynamic social force is liable to generate an equal and opposite counterforce.
The European Community's revolutionary dynamic had and has exceptionally
powerful counterforces. To understand the struggle which has been, and will
be, the story of the E.C.'s constitutional development, we, as social archaeolo-
gists, must uncover the layers of counterrevolution. As depth sociologists, we
must perform a socio-analysis of the mind of the Community to identify the
patterns of its unconscious behavior. The political unconscious of a society is
the scene of an energetic interacting of ideas and forces half-hidden beneath
the familiar surface of organized political debate. What we find is that there
are four formidable psychic counterforces affecting E.C. constitutional develop-
ment. They may be labeled nostalgia for diplomacy, managerial absolutism,
poujadist anti-communalism, and pan-statism.
A. Nostalgia for Diplomacy
Near the surface of the Community unconscious is a nostalgia in some
members of the political ruling class for a world safe for diplomats and "states-
men." This was the passionate preference of General de Gaulle, who became
President of France only months after the ratification of the EEC Treaty in 1958
and found himself obliged to live in querulous cohabitation with the unruly
monster until he left office in 1969. His wish was for a Europe of the Nations,
an idea that still finds some warm support at the highest levels of European
politics. It means that the European Community should be reconceived as a
traditional device of international relations, reminscent of the Congress system
of the nineteenth century, in which the executive branches of governments meet
to discuss and dispose of their common problems. Echoing distantly Karl von
Clausewitz and William James, one might say that, on this view, the European
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Community is the pursuit of national interest by other means and the political
equivalent of war.
To take the intergovernmental view of the Community is necessarily to
ignore the two fundamental principles of the E.C. legal system: E.C. law is a
direct source of law within the Member States, and it prevails over conflicting
national law. Such a view also ignores the special character of two of the four
Community institutions: the European Parliament, which is directly elected by
the people of the Community, and the Court of Justice, which has been a strong
and dynamic court, with extensive jurisdiction, behaving like the U.S. Supreme
Court in building a coherent and effective Community legal system. And such
a view reconceives the nature and function of another of the institutions, the
European Commission, which is something like a cabinet of seventeen Europe-
an Ministers who are employed by the Community to find and serve the public
interest, but which General de Gaulle described as an areopagus of technocrats.
In short, the intergovernmental view chooses to regard the fourth institution,
the Council, as the essence of the Community, the place where national govern-
ments are represented, the place where governments can feel that they are
conducting a rather superior form of Europe's age-old diplomacy.
B. Managerial Absolutism
The second layer of the counterrevolutionary consciousness is to be found
in what may be called managerial absolutism. Managerial absolutism is a
corruption of modern democracies. L'Etat, c'est nous. The leading members
of the public power-holding groups in present-day democracies now tend to
behave as if they knew that, between elections, their job is to manage the
country, to the best of their ability, using their own ideas and judgments,
fortified by an education and other life privileges beyond those of the mass of
the people. They see elections as just another management task. In short, they
see democracy simply as a system of licensed public management.
The ultimate biological source of the self-confidence of managerial absolut-
ists is to be found in the hierarchical habits of pre-human primate groups. More
immediately, it is to be found in the long social conditioning of the ruled and
their rulers in the period of monarchical absolutism. Modern democracy is a
new form of social conditioning, which succeeds by confusing social authority
with social solidarity, so that social managers are able to produce purposive
social effects far exceeding in scale and efficiency those that were achieved by
absolute monarchs.
The European Community may be seen by a modern public manager as
either a splendid opportunity for management on a very grand scale or as an
uncouth threat to the well-ordered national enterprise.
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C. Poujadist Anti-Communalism
The third natural counterforce to the revolutionary dynamism of the Europe-
an Community idea is a particular form of anti-communalism. The title of the
European Community in German is Europaische Gemeinschaft. Regardless of
whether the connection was apparent io the creators of the European Communi-
ty, it so happens that that title uses one term of a famous distinction proposed
by the German sociologist, Ferdinand Thnnies: the contrast between Gemein-
schaft and Gesellschaft. %
This distinction is reminiscent of that which was noted above between West
European and American democracy. A Gemeinschaft might be said to be the
ideal-type of a community in which members identify themselves with the
community, a society based on participation in the finding and implementation
of the common interest. A Gesellschaft would then be the ideal-type of a
contractual society, based on reciprocity and mutuality of the individual mem-
bers.
Since the European Community was created by means of a set of treaties
among the Member States, its formal basis seems to be fundamentally and
crudely contractual. And that basis is changed by amending the treaties, the
amendments being formulated by the executive branches of the governments
of the Member States through a process that they recognize not as constitution-
making but as international negotiation. All the alterations that will be made
herafter to the structure of the Community system will be brought about in this
way, by negotiation and formal agreement. They will not be brought about as
if they were the internal social development of a communalist democracy.
However, as has been suggested above, the novel inner dynamic of the EC
system is the dynamic of modern communalist democracy, the seeking of a
European public interest that transcends national and local public interests, let
alone purely private interests. Now there is a mindset that can smell commu-
nalism from a great distance. Poujadism is an old-fashioned word for a perenni-
al political phenomenon.9 It is a complex political attitude, which most easily
may be evoked in the mind of a particular social class, a class that for present
purposes may be identified by the word "demos." The demos is the class of
the small shopkeeper, the small businessman, the small farmer, the lower civil
servant, the lower manager. They are petty bourgeois, kleinburgerlich, the
sergeants and corporals of society. It is a class with a significant property stake,
but without proportionate social power. It is a reservoir of selective resentment,
not against the ruling classes as such, but against those who seem to wield
some sort of usurped social power (especially intellectuals, civil servants,
politicians, financiers), and against those who have no social power, but who
8. F. TONNIES, GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFr (1887) (C. Loomis trans. 1957).
9. Pierre Poujade was a right-wing politician of the French Fourth Republic in the 1950's and leader
of a group called "Union de fraternit6 frangaise."
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avoid the burdens of social solidarity and yet gain unearned soical benefits
(ethnic minorities, students, the unemployed, all those who are feckless types,
scroungers, or layabouts).
In time of peace, the mass of the people, the "polloi," provide millions of
working bodies and millions of votes. In time of war, they provide millions of
dead bodies. The "aristoi," the class of all those privileged by money or educa-
tion or energy (physical and psychic), dominate the political process. The
characteristic dance of democratic politics is a struggle for the mind of the
demos, who may give their support, at one time to the polloi against the alleged
corruption of the aristoi or, at another time, to the aristoi against the so-called
lumpen ignorance of the polloi. The demos lies on either side of the center of
gravity of society. They keep society on an even keel with their regular lives,
their stern morality, their social standards, their modest but firm ambitions. To
obtain their political support is like flooding a ballast to shift the center of
gravity of a ship. The demos has been mobilized again and again as a counter-
revolutionary force, used again and again by the aristoi. They are a standing
temptation to politicians, especially extremist politicians. They may be ad-
dressed above the heads of the current operators of the political system, with
rousing appeals to the Nation, the Flag, the Fatherland, our Way of Life,
Independence, or Sovereignty. They have been used against the French Revolu-
tion and the French Monarchy, against clericalism and Jesuits and free thinkers
and communists, against Weimar, against "foreign entanglements," against the
New Deal, against the welfare state, against immigration, against international
development aid, against internationalism and cosmopolitanism in general and
the United Nations in particular, and now, perhaps, in the Soviet Union, against
perestroika.
To the poujadist mind, democratic communalism is a sinister system for
conferring power on the corrupt and incompetent (politicians and civil servants)
to interfere with our lives and, what is worse, power to give handouts to the
undeserving. International communalism would then be the ultimate irresponsi-
bility, when the corrupt and the incompetent and the undeserving are also
foreign.
D. Pan-statism
Pan-statism is another corruption of modern democracies. It means that the
public realm of society tends to swamp the whole of society, including the
private realms of its citizens. Pan-statism is the inadvertent totalitarianism of
modern democracy. The whole of life tends to become a cloudy mixture of
politics, capitalism, and show business. Social life as a whole tends to take on
the character of a collective fantasy. And the collective fantasy tends to become
the only reality that the citizen knows because of its spectacularly energetic
effects: the thrilling set-pieces of public affairs (including elections and wars),
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the godlike achievements of technology, and the mind-filling charisma of
entertainers.
The problem of forming and institutionalizing an adequate conception of
the relationship between the public power system of a society and the society
as a cultural totality is as old as organized human society. In modern democra-
cies, we have learned that it is not only the tyrant or the absolute monarch who
can take over the whole of society in the name of the state. When the idea of
popular democracy seemed, misleadingly, at last to identify the people with the
state, it became easy to take another false step: to identify the state with
society. A similar process has been at work in the European Community. Since
the E.C. has seemed to be some sort of excrescence from the national societies,
formed by the coalescing of political activity originating within the national
societies, it seemed that its nature was to be a political system similar in kind
to traditional intergovernmental organizations. That is to say, it was an exclave
of national societies, a self-standing political system outside all national societ-
ies, existing in a sort of social vacuum.
The absence of a transcendant social framework for the Community power-
system has generated a cascade of consequences in the constitutional develop-
ment of the E.C. over the last forty years. It has meant that the E.C. system,
a particular political and legal system, reminiscent of national state systems,
has come to be equated with the idea of "Europe" for many people. It has
meant that the E.C. has seemed to have no reason for existing other than the
continued willing of the state systems of the states that formed it. Above all,
it has meant that the E.C. communal interest has come to be perceived as an
aggregated interest, aggregated from separate national interests. In other words,
it has meant that the E.C. has tended to revert to a pre-modern democratic
model, of individualism aggregated rather than communalism distributed. This
in turn means that there is a sense of retrograde motion in the development of
democracy in Western Europe, as politicians and civil servants take over the
negotiatation of new laws as if they were negotiating treaties. The process of
E.C. legislation has thereby managed to detach itself from the national political
accountability, feeble as it now is in all the Member States, which is applicable
to national legislation. In British eyes, we seem to be reverting to the sixteenth-
century period of the Tudor constitution, when strong monarchs used the
parliamentary system as a machine for policymaking (whim-fulfillment) through
lawmaking.
Thus everyday constitutional phenomena in the European Community are
whitecaps on the waves of a profound and turbulent sea. The European Com-
munity is a fragile structure, formed as the ever-changing dialectical resultant
of forces which are themselves struggling dialectically with their own negations.
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International democracy inspires a reinvigorated diplomacy. International
communalism breathes new life into national particularism. The international
management of 340 million human beings as if they were so many productive
units reawakens the irrepressible desire in the human individual to count as a
person and not merely to be counted as a citizen. The manic ambition of the
public realm to turn everything into a managed collective fantasy forces the
people back into a world of private realities, some more rational than others.
The people of Europe have watched patiently as one gang after another has
strutted across the stage of European history, seeking to rule our lives: kings
and courtiers, bishops and priests, generals and politicians, bureaucrats and tax
collectors, factory owners and financiers. The so-called European Community
is merely the latest in a long line. And now, for the first time in the whole of
European history, the scene of the drama is a desert, a wasteland, "[w]here
ignorant armies clash by night." 10 From the whole extraordinary process of
European social reconstruction there has been absent the one thing that has
made it possible and the only thing that can redeem it as progressive social self-
creating. The emptiness at the heart of the so-called European Community is
a spiritual absence.
The true European Community is the society of Europe which has been
made by and in the European mind.
The true Europe is palimpsest Europe, each layer permanently present like
the succeeding life-stages of a human being. It is the Europe of the tribes. If
Julius Caesar or Tacitus returned to write about our strange ways, he would
find the tribes he knew and some more, some of them still fighting each other
(in Ireland and Spain and Belgium and northern Spain and the Balkans and
Central Europe and Russia.. .). It is the Europe of the nations as tribes
coagulated into defendable selves formed from place and language and custom.
If Alfred or Charlemagne returned, he would find the nations still in place and
still in competition. It is the Europe of the kings as centralizing law and
administration were used to turn nations into economically effective machines.
Henry III or Louis XIV would recognize our dynamic and unstable state-
systems.
But, before and above everything else, it is the Europe of the mind. Europe
formed itself communally in the European mind. Ideas, of religion and philoso-
phy and law and science, have crossed frontiers as if there were no frontiers.
And so have all the other products of the spirit: literature, music, the fine arts,
and architecture. We formed our idea of human life and of the Good Life
together. Our tribes and nations and states, in all their seething particularity,
have shared in the timeless task of making a single European spirit.
The rediscovery of this true European Community will be the transforming
event in the future constitutional development of what is called the European
10. M. ARNOLD, Dover Beach, in 2 POEMS 56, 57 (1903).
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Community. It means that the new total social process of Europe will be not
merely the aggregation of the interests of national societies, but a struggle to
form a new vision out of the highest values of European society, a struggle to
construct from that vision a true European Community, a democracy of democ-
racies, of which the institutional system of the European Community will be
not the whole content but merely a leading sub-system. The true Europe will
resume command of the making of the true European Community.
